An unexpected connection on the professional network. An offer of employment from a headhunter, probably a female agent, operating from China. The opportunity to make perhaps £20,000 on the side preparing a small number of political analyses for a firm from China containing confidential or “insider” information. Compensation in digital currency or physical money favored.
It may seem obvious, on this telling, that something about this method would be suspicious. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – leading the domestic spy agency to warn repeatedly about their operations online.
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated Chinese agents were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, commercial, military and scientific classified information. But a new campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
An espionage warning was issued on this week via the administrative teams of Lindsay Hoyle and his Lords equivalent: a brief presentation after the repeated efforts of certain individuals and other operatives to contact Members of Parliament, lords, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anyone who might become a source.
In the typical manner of British intelligence, there was no official release of the protective guidance from the agency or the interior ministry. But the service was aware its advisory document would leak once it was sent electronically out to parliament. Republishing it in the media helps the general population more easily recognize interactions with a fraudulent purpose.
This warning has the impact of flushing out additional details from within Westminster, although that is not the agency's primary purpose. The agency wants public figures to recognize that just because interactions on LinkedIn are not as toxic as on other social platforms, it does not mean they are without risk.
Additionally, the domestic spy agency believed to have been reacting to a particular event in the legislature, though the burst of activity does come after the embarrassing failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his friend another person on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of spying for China – a charge they rejected – but inability to complete a trial under the since replaced Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been insufficiently defended.
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in spying operations risk significant criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a criminal offense if a person participates in conduct that is or is likely to “materially assist a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural inquiry, however, is what Beijing has to achieve. A politician who is not a government minister will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an associate of theirs less so. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in recent years, the Britain's China policy on matters such as the telecom firm or the human rights situation or alleged atrocities was being influenced by MPs.
To a degree there are cultural differences as well. Autocratic regimes like China’s export intelligence collection methods and the size of its intelligence apparatus is enormous, employing 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have more English speakers engaged in this than Western agencies have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop contacts over the extended period and at times even the agencies have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and espionage. “China has a low threshold for which details is deemed to be useful,” the minister responsible Dan Jarvis told parliamentarians on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the political cycle may result in someone quickly marginal becomes significant.
Another way to consider the relentless efforts at covert information gathering is in the wider context of the geopolitical contest between China and the Western nations at a level below the point of direct conflict. The nation has stepped up its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of millions connected equipment.
Beijing is engaged in persistent efforts to find covert sources on British democracy via digital means because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate power and because it has the capability.
A tech journalist and digital strategist with over a decade of experience covering emerging technologies and innovation.